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Abstract—Accountability is a recent paradigm in security pro-
tocol design which aims to eliminate traditional trust assumptions
on parties and hold them accountable for their misbehavior. It
is meant to establish trust in the first place and to recognize
and react if this trust is violated. In this work, we discuss a
protocol-agnostic definition of accountability: a protocol provides
accountability (w.r.t. some security property) if it can identify all
misbehaving parties, where misbehavior is defined as a deviation
from the protocol that causes a security violation.
We provide a mechanized method for the verification of
accountability and demonstrate its use for verification and attack
finding on various examples from the accountability and causal-
ity literature, including Certificate Transparency and Kroll’s
Accountable Algorithms protocol. We reach a high degree of
automation by expressing accountability in terms of a set of
trace properties and show their soundness and completeness.
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of many cryptographic protocols relies on
trust in some third parties. Accountability protocols seek to
establish and ensure this trust by deterrence, often by detecting
participants that behave dishonestly. Providing accountability
can thus strengthen existing properties in case formerly trusted
parties deviate, e.g, the tallying party in an electronic voting
protocol or the PKI in a key-exchange protocol. Examples of
protocols where accountability is relevant include Certificate
Transparency [35] to achieve accountability for the PKI, OCSP
stapling [33] to reach accountability for digital certificate
status requests in PKI and Accountable Algorithms [21], a
proposal for accountable computations performed by authori-
ties.
We regard accountability as a meta-property: given some
traditional security property ϕ, a protocol that provides ac-
countability for ϕ permits a specific party or the public to
determine whether a violation of ϕ occurred, and if that is
the case, which party or parties should be held accountable.
Accountability provides an incentive for ‘trusted’ parties to
remain honest, and allows other parties to react to possible
violations, e.g., by revocation or fault recovery. It can also be
used to build deterrence mechanisms.
For a long time, accountability in the security setting lacked
a protocol-independent definition. Generalized definitions and
algorithms have been proposed for distributed systems [17],
where a complete view of every component is available.
In the security setting, however, the problem of identifying
dishonest parties is much harder, as they might deviate from
the protocol in an invisible manner. In unpublished work,
Ku¨nnemann et al. [24] approach this problem using causal
reasoning. Instead of identifying all participants that, perhaps
invisibly, deviate from their specifications; they identify the
parties that cause a violation. Even if a limited part of the
communication is available, cryptographic mechanisms such
as digital signatures, commitments and zero-knowledge proofs
can be used to leave traces that can be causally related to the
violation, e.g., a transmission of a secret.
In this paper, we provide the first mechanized verification
technique for their approach, which was stated in a custom
process calculus in which several parties can choose individual
ways of misbehaving. First, we propose a variant of their
definition in what we call the single-adversary setting. In
this setting, a single adversary controls all dishonest parties.
This setting is used in almost all existing protocol verification
tools. This vastly simplifies the definition of accountability
and enables the use of off-the-shelf protocol verifiers. Second,
we give verification conditions implying accountability for
a specific counterfactual relation. This relation links what
actually happened to what could have happened, e.g., if only a
subset of parties had mounted an attack. Causation and, as we
will demonstrate, accountability depend on how this relation
is specified. We use these verification conditions and off-the-
shelf tools to automatically verify Certificate Transparency,
OCSP stapling and other protocols for accountability w.r.t. this
relation. However, more complex scenarios require specifying
more fine-grained counterfactual relations. We show for the
general case: this definition can be decomposed into several
trace properties and the decomposition is sound and complete.
For our case studies, the verification conditions consist of 7 to
31 such properties; most of them can be verified within tenths
of seconds. Third, we implement this verification method for
an extension of the applied-pi calculus to provide a convenient
toolchain for the specification and verification of account-
ability protocols. We verify accountability or find attacks
on a) several toy examples that highlight the complexity of
accountability, b) an abstract modelling of the case where
accountability is achieved by maintaining a central audit log,
c) several examples from the causality literature, d) OCSP-
Stapling, e) Certificate Transparency and f) Accountable Al-
gorithms, a seminal protocol for accountable computations in
a real-world setting. We thus list our contributions as follows:
‚ a new definition of accountability in the single-adversary
setting (which is simpler than the previous definition [24]
due to the single-adversary setting).
‚ a verification technique, based on a sound and complete
translation to a set of trace properties that is compatible
with a mature and stable toolchain for protocol verifica-
tion.
‚ a demonstration on several case studies, including two
fixes to Kroll’s Accountable Algorithms protocol, and a
machine-verified proof that both fixes entail accountabil-
ity for both participants.
II. ACCOUNTABILITY
To define accountability, we follow the intuition that a pro-
tocol provides accountability if it can always determine which
parties caused a security violation. In this sense, accountability
is a meta-property: we speak of accountability for violations
of ϕ. If no violation occurs, no party causes it; if no party
causes a violation, there is no violation. Hence accountability
w.r.t. ϕ implies verifiability of ϕ [27].
To reason about failures, i.e., violations of ϕ, our formalism
has to allow parties to deviate from the protocol. Each party
is either honest, i.e., it follows the behaviour prescribed by
the protocol, or it is dishonest, i.e., it may deviate from this
behaviour. Often there is a judging party, which is typically
trusted, i.e., it is always honest. A dishonest party is not neces-
sarily deviating, it might run a process that is indistinguishable
from its protocol behaviour. Hence it is impossible to detect
all dishonest parties.
In the security setting, parties cannot monitor each other
completely. Typically, they only receive messages addressed or
redirected to them. This includes the judging party. Therefore,
a deviating party A can send a secret to another deviating party
B and the judging party may not notice. Under these circum-
stances, identifying all deviating parties is also impossible.
Instead, we focus on identifying all parties causing the
violation of the security property ϕ. The protocols we consider
in this work are designed in a way the parties that are deviating
(and thus dishonest) will have to leave evidence in order to
cause security violations.
The definition we provide here is a simplified version of
an earlier, causality-based definition [24], adapted to a setting
where there is only a single adversary controlling all deviating
parties, or equivalently, where the deviating parties share all
the knowledge they obtain. Both definitions are based on
sufficient causation [12, 22]. The intuition is to capture all
parties for which the fact that they are deviating at all is
causing the violation. This may not only be a single party,
but also a set of parties. If two parties A, B collude against
a secret sharing scheme with a threshold of two and expose
some secret, the single party A would not be considered a
cause, but we would say that tA,Bu have jointly caused the
failure.
Assume a fixed finite set of parties A “ tA,B, . . .u.
Intuitively, the fact that a party or a set of parties S Ď A
are deviating is a cause for a violation iff:
SC1. A violation indeed occurred and S indeed deviated.
SC2. If all deviating parties, except the parties in S, behaved
honestly, the same violation would still occur.
SC3. S is minimal, i.e., SC1 and SC2 hold for no strict subset
of S.
The first condition is self-explanatory. The second formalizes
that the misbehaviour of the parties in S alone is sufficient to
disrupt the protocol. For the secret sharing scheme scenario
above, if the party A deviated alone, this would not cause
the exposure of the secret, so SC2 would not hold. tA,Bu,
however, would meet all of the conditions. SC2 reasons about
a scenario that is different from the events that actually took
place, which is called a counterfactual in causal reasoning. At
the end of this section, we will discuss different counterfactual
relations between the actual and the counterfactual course of
events. The third condition SC3 ensures minimality. It removes
parties that deviated, but whose deviations are not relevant to
the coming about of the violation.
Note that there can be more than one (joint) cause. If the
aforementioned protocol would run in two sessions, one in
which A and B colluded to expose the secret and another one
in which A and C colluded to expose a different secret, there
would be two causes, tA,Bu and tA,Cu, each individually
satisfying SC1 to SC3, each being an individual cause for the
failure. This nicely separates joint causes (A and B working
together; A and C working together) from independent causes
(the first collusion and the second collusion).
Intuitively, an accountability mechanism provides account-
ability for ϕ if it can always point out all S Ď A causing a
violation of ϕ, or H if there is no violation.
Need for trusted parties: Accountability protocols aim at
eliminating trust assumptions, yet they often require a trusted
judging party. But, if the judging party operates offline and
their judgement can be computed with public knowledge, then
any member of the public can replicate the judgement and
validate the result. The judging party is thus not a third party,
but the observer itself, who we assume can be trusted to follow
the protocol, i.e., not cheat herself.
Individually deviating parties vs. single adversary: Pro-
tocol verification tools usually consider a single adversary
representing both an intruder in the network and untrusted
parties. Typically, the attacker sends a corruption message
to these parties, they accordingly transmit their secrets to
the adversary. As messages are transmitted over an insecure
network, the adversary can then impersonate the parties with
their secrets. This is a sound over-approximation in case of
security properties like secrecy and authentication, as the
adversaries are stronger if they cooperate. It also simplifies
verification: a single adversary can be modelled in terms
of non-deterministic state transitions for message reception
(see, e.g., [2, Theorem 1]). Many protocol verification tools
operate in this way [36, 9, 11, 14]. We therefore focus on the
single-adversary setting, in order to exploit existing methods
for protocol verification and encourage the development of
accountability protocols. This is the main distinction between
our simplified definition of accountability and the earlier
definition [24]. Nevertheless, the philosophical difference be-
tween these two settings remains relevant for our analysis,
as it is based on causal reasoning about deviating parties.
In Section IX, we discuss the difference between these two
settings and elaborate on our current understanding of them.
Protocol accountability: Let a protocol P be defined in
some calculus, e.g., the applied-pi calculus, and assume that
we can define the set of traces induced by the protocol,
denoted tracespP q. We also assume a counterfactual relation r
between an actual trace and a counterfactual trace. Depending
on the protocol, different counterfactual relations can capture
the desired granularity of a judgement. We will describe this
relation and give examples in the following section.
Given a trace t, a security property ϕ can be evaluated, e.g.,
t ( ϕ iff ϕ is true for t, which we will sometimes abbreviate to
ϕptq. We assume that any trace t P tracespP q determines the
set of dishonest agents, i.e., those who received the corruption
message from the adversary and define corruptedptq Ď A to
be this set.
We can now define the a posteriori verdict (apv), which
specifies all subsets of A that are sufficient to cause  ϕ.
The task of an accountability protocol is to always compute
the apv, but without having full knowledge of what actually
happened, i.e., t.
Definition 1 (a posteriori verdict). Given an accountability
protocol P , a property ϕ, a trace t and a relation r, the
a posteriori verdict, which formalizes the set of parties causing
 ϕ, is defined as:
apvP,ϕ,rptq :“ tS | t (  ϕ and S minimal s.t.
Dt1 : rpt, t1q ^ corruptedpt1q “ S^ t1 (  ϕu.
Relation r is reflexive, transitive and rpt, t1q implies
corruptedpP, t1q Ď corruptedpP, tq.
Each set of parties S P apvP,ϕ,rptq is a sufficient cause for
an eventual violation, in the sense outlined at the beginning
of this section. The condition t (  ϕ ensures that indeed a
violation took place. If the parties in S did not deviate in t,
then S would not be minimal, hence SC1 holds. SC3 holds by
the minimality condition. The remaining conditions capture
SC2: t1 is a counterfactual trace w.r.t. t, a trace contrary to
what actually happened.1 In t1, only the parties in S may
deviate, which should suffice to derive a violation. We define
the relation r to constrain the set of counterfactual traces. At
the very least, the condition that corruptedpt1q Ď corruptedptq
should hold to guarantee that for any violating trace, a minimal
S is defined.2 We will discuss a few variants of r in the
following section.
For a given trace, the apv outputs a set of sufficient causes,
i.e., a set of sets of agents. We call this output as the verdict.
1Technically, the set of counterfactual traces includes t1 “ t, as r is reflex-
ive, and thus not every instance of t1 is, strictly speaking, a counterfactual.
For brevity, we prefer to nevertheless call t1 a counterfactual, despite this
imprecision.
2Consider r total, t with t (  ϕ and corruptedptq “ tAu and t1 with
t1 (  ϕ and corruptedpt1q “ tBu as a counterexample. Neither tAu nor
tBu would be minimal.
We also remark that apvP,ϕ,rptq “ H iff t ( ϕ, i.e., an empty
verdict means the absence of a violation — there can be no
cause for an event that did not happen.
To abstract from the mechanism by which an accountability
protocol announces the purported set of causes for a violation
— this could range from a designated party computing them
to a public ledger that allows the public to compute it —
we introduce a verdict function from tracespP q Ñ 22A . An
accountability protocol is thus described by P and the verdict
function. We can now state accountability: a verdict function
provides accountability if it always computes the apv.
Definition 2 (accountability). A verdict function verdict :
tracespP q Ñ 22A provides a protocol P with accountability
for a property ϕ (w.r.t. r) if, for any trace t P tracespP q
verdictptq “ apvP,ϕ,rptq.
Example 1. Assume a protocol in which a centralized monitor
controls access to some resource, e.g., confidential patient
records. Rather than preventing exceptional access patterns,
e.g., requesting the file of another doctor’s patient, the requests
are allowed, but logged by the monitor. Accountability tends
to be preferable over prevention in such cases, e.g., in case of
emergencies.
The set of agents comprises doctors D1, D2 and the cen-
tralized monitor. The centralized monitor is trusted and effec-
tuates requests only if they are digitally signed. The security
property ϕ is true if no exceptional request was effectuated.
Per protocol, D1 and D2 never send exceptional requests,
however, if in trace t, the central adversary corrupts them
and learns their signing keys, he can act on their behalf and
sign exceptional requests. The set of dishonest parties contains
those corrupted by the adversary, corruptedptq “ tD1, D2u.
A verdict ttD1u, tD2uu indicates that both D1 and D2 de-
viated in a way that caused a violation, i.e., an exceptional
request was effectuated. If a third doctor D3 was also in the
protocol and it was corrupted D3 P corruptedptq, but never
signed any request, then it would not be involved in the apv
apvP,ϕ,rptq “ ttD1u, tD2uu. The apv for this protocol can
be computed by only taking the log into account: a verdict
function verdict , that operates on the monitor’s log, can be
defined to compose singleton verdicts for each party that
signed an exceptional request. This verdict function is easy
to implement, yet it provides the protocol with accountability
for ϕ because it computes apvP,ϕ,r correctly.
Counterfactual relation: The relation r in the definition of
the apv defines which counterfactual scenarios are deemed
relevant in SC2. While there is an agreement in the causality
literature that t1 cannot be chosen arbitrarily, there is no
agreement on how they should relate. We slightly change the
previous monitoring example and discuss why the relation is
important.
Example 2. Assume that the monitor supports a second
mechanism to handle requests. Here, a doctor D1 can also
sign his exceptional request and ask his chief of medicine
C to approve it. Assume in trace t, both D1 and C collude
and use this mechanism to effectuate an exceptional request,
violating ϕ. Intuitively, one would expect the apv, relying on
logs, to give the verdict ttD1, Cuu. However, D1 could have
used the first mechanism for this request. Hence, there is a
counterfactual trace t1 where only D1 is dishonest. If rpt, t1q,
then the more intuitive verdict ttD1, Cuu is not minimal, but
apvP,ϕ,rptq “ ttD1uu is minimal, shifting the blame to D1
alone. The intuitive response would be: ‘But that is not what
happened!’, which is precisely what r needs to capture.
We discuss three approaches for relating factual and coun-
terfactual traces:
‚ by control-flow: rcpt, t1q iff t and t1 have similar control-
flow. Several works in the causality literature relate traces
by their control-flow [12, 24, 26], requiring counterfac-
tuals to retain, to varying degree, the same control-flow.
See [25] for a detailed discussion about control flow in
Pearl’s influential causation framework. For simplicity,
the notion we present (cf. Section VII) captures only
the control-flow of trusted parties, i.e., parties guaranteed
to be never controlled by the adversary. In case of the
example, the control-flow of the trusted monitor would
distinguish these two mechanisms.
‚ by kind of violation: rkpt, t1q iff t and t1 describe the same
kind of violations. This approach is, e.g., used in criminal
law to solve causal problems where the classical ‘what-if‘
test fails, e.g., a person was poisoned, but shot before the
poison took effect. The classical test for causality (sine
qua non) gives unsatisfying results (without the shot, the
person would still have died), unless one describes the
causal event in more detail, i.e., by distinguishing death
from shooting from death from poisoning ( [13, p. 188];
see also [31, p. 46]). For security protocols, the instance
of the violation could be characterized by the session, the
participating parties or other variables that are free in in
the security property ϕ (see Lowe [30]). This relation is
informal and depends on intuition, so it is not used in our
analysis.
‚ weakest relation according to Def. 1: rwpt, t1q ðñ
corruptedpP, t1q Ď corruptedpP, tq. This relation is
conceptually simple and suitable for many protocols in
which collusion is not an issue, i. e., verdicts contain only
singleton sets. Outside this class, it may give unintuitive
a posteriori verdicts in cases where t requires collusion,
but one of the colluding parties could mount a possibly
very different attack by themselves.
In Section III, we provide verification conditions for rw. In
Section IV, we provide more general verification conditions
that apply to arbitrary relations, as some scenarios require
more fine-grained analysis, and later we mechanize it for rc.
III. VERIFICATION CONDITIONS FOR rw
In this section, we define a set of verification conditions
parametric in a security property ϕ and a verdict function. If
TABLE I
VERIFICATION CONDITIONS for rw.
conditions formulae
Exhaustiveness (XH): @t. ω1ptq _ ¨ ¨ ¨ _ ωnptq
Exclusiveness (XC): @t, i, j. i ‰ j ùñ  pωiptq ^ ωjptqq
Sufficiency of each ωi @S P Vi. Dt.
s.t. Vi ‰ H (SFωi,ϕ,S):  ϕptq ^ corruptedptq “ S
Verifiability of each ωi @t. ωiptq ùñ
(Vωi,Vi ): pVi “ H ðñ ϕptqq
Minimality of each Vi @S P Vi @S1 Ĺ S
(Mϕ,Vi ): Et.  ϕptq ^ corruptedptq “ S1
Uniqueness of each Vi @t. ωiptq ùñ
(Uωi,Vi ):
Ť
SPVi S Ď corruptedptq
Completeness of each Vi @S Ď ŤS1PVi S1 @j. Vj “ tSu ùñ
(CVi ): S P Vi.
(t is quantified over tracespP q)
these conditions are met, they provide a protocol with account-
ability for ϕ w.r.t. the weakest condition on counterfactuals
rwpt, t1q ¨¨“ corruptedpt1q Ď corruptedptq. Each of these
conditions is a trace property and can thus be verified by off-
the-shelf protocol verification tools. In our case studies, we
will use these verification conditions to verify accountability
properties for the Certificate Transparency protocol.
The main idea: we assume the verdict function is described
as a case distinction over a set of trace properties ω1 to ωn.
Any of these observations ωi is then assigned a verdict Vi.
Definition 3 (verification conditions). Let verdict be a verdict
function of form:
verdictptq “
$’’&’’%
V1 if ω1ptq
...
Vn if ωnptq
and ϕ a predicate on traces. We define the verification condi-
tion γϕ,verdict as the conjunction of the formulae in Table I.
We briefly go over these conditions. The case distinction
needs to be exhaustive (XH) and exclusive (XC), because
verdict functions are total. For any observation ωi that leads
to a non-empty verdict, any set of parties S in this verdict
needs to be able to produce a violating trace on their own
(SFωi,ϕ,S). However, removing any element from S should
make it impossible to produce a violation (Mϕ,Vi ), due to the
minimality requirement in Def. 1. If an observation leads to
the empty verdict, it needs to imply the security property ϕ,
because accountability implies verifiability (Vωi,Vi ). Whenever
an observation ωi is made, all parties that appear in the
ensuing verdict have necessarily been corrupted (Uωi,Vi ). This
ensures uniqueness; if there was a second sufficient and
minimal verdict, part of the verdict would correspond to a
trace that corrupts parties that do not appear in the verdict
(details in the proof of completeness, Appendix C in the full
version [23]). Finally, if there is a singleton verdict (e.g.,
Vj “ ttB,Cuu) containing only parties that appear in another
composite verdict (e.g., Vi “ ttA,Bu, tA,Cuu) then traces
that give the former are related to traces that give the latter
(where, at least, A, B and C were dishonest). Hence the
singleton verdict needs to be included. (CVi ).
We show these conditions sound and complete in Ap-
pendix C in the full version [23]. Practically, this means
that any counter-example to any lemma generated from these
conditions demonstrates an attack against accountability.
Example 3. Consider the centralized monitor from Exam-
ple 1, and, for simplicity, assume there is only one doctor
D. The verdict function gives V1 “ ttDuu if it logged an
action signed by D, if this action was effectuated and if
it was exceptional. Otherwise, it gives V2 “ H. To show
that his verdict function provides accountability for ϕ ¨¨“
no exceptional action was effectuated, one would show:
‚ the case distinction exhaustive and exclusive,
‚ that the attacker can effectuate an exceptional action if
D’s signing key is known (SFωi,ϕ,S),
‚ that the ‘otherwise’ condition (no exceptional action was
effectuated and signed by D) implies that no exceptional
action was effectuated by anyone (Vωi,Vi ),
‚ that no exceptional action can be effectuated without
knowledge of D’s signing key (Mϕ,Vi ), and
‚ that D’s signature on an exceptional action that was ef-
fectuated can only be obtained by corrupting D (Uωi,Vi ).
‚ Completeness (CVi ): V1 is the only non-empty verdict.
IV. VERIFICATION CONDITIONS FOR ARBITRARY r
As outlined in Example 2, there are scenarios where a
more fine-grained analysis is necessary. These scenarios are
characterized by violations that can be provoked either by
a set of colluding parties or by a subset thereof, using a
different mechanism. Hence we provide a different and more
elaborate set of verification criteria (see Table II). They fall
into two categories: the first consists of trace properties that
again can be verified using off-the-shelf protocol verifiers.
The second relates the case distinction used to define the
verdict to the relation: in general, all traces that fall into the
same case should be related. The verification of the second
kind of conditions depends on the relation chosen and can
be conducted by hand. In a later section, we mechanize the
verification of these conditions for the relation rc specifically.
Hence our method is fully automated for this relation.
These verification criteria are sound and complete. (see
Appendix D in the full version [23]). This means that the
conjunction of all verification criteria is logically equivalent
to accountability and thus contradicts Datta et. al.’s view that
‘accountability depends on actual causation and it is not a trace
property’ [12].
Definition 4 (verification conditions). Let verdict be a verdict
function of the form from Definition 3 and ϕ be a predicate
on traces. We define the verification condition νϕ,verdict as the
conjunction of the formulae in Table II, where t and ti range
over tracespP q.
TABLE II
VERIFICATION CONDITIONS for arbitrary r.
conditions formulae
Exhaustiveness (XH): @t. ω1ptq _ ¨ ¨ ¨ _ ωnptq
Exclusiveness (XC): @t, i, j. i ‰ j ùñ  pωiptq ^ ωjptqq
Sufficiency for each ωi, Dt. ωiptq ^  ϕptq
with singleton Vi “ tSu ^corruptedptq “ S
(SFSωi,ϕ,Vi“tSu):
Sufficiency for each ωi, @S. S P Vi ùñ
with |Vi| ě 2 Dj. Ri,j ^ Vj “ tSu
(SFRR,ωi,ϕ,|Vi|ě2):
Verifiability for each ωi, @t. ωiptq ùñ
(Vωi,Vi ): pVi “ H ðñ ϕptqq
Minimality, for @S1. S1 Ĺ S ùñ
singleton Vi “ tSu Et. ωiptq ^ corruptedptq “ S1
(Mϕ,Vi ):
Minimality, for ES,S1 P Vi S1 Ĺ S
composite Vi, |Vi| ě 2
(MR,|Vi|ě2):
Uniqueness of each Vi @t. ωiptq ùñ S Ď corruptedptq
with Vi “ tSu
(Uωi,Vi“tSu):
Completeness of |Vi| ě 2 @j, S. Ri,j ^ Vj “ tSu ùñ
(C|Vi|ě2): DS1. S1 P Vi ^ S Ď S1
Relation is lifting of r if Vi, Vj ‰ H then
(RLR,ωi,ωj ,Vi,Vj ): @t, t1. ωiptq ^ ωjpt1q^Ri,j ðñ rpt, t1q
Relation is reflexive and @i, j. Vi is singleton
terminating on singleton ^Ri,i ^ pRi,j ùñ i “ jq
(RSR,Vi“tSu):
(t is quantified over tracespP q)
Again, we assume the verdict to be expressed as a case
distinction. This case distinction must be sufficiently fine-
grained to capture all relevant classes of counterfactuals, e.g.,
all ways the violation could come about in terms of r. We
distinguish between the empty verdict (meaning no violation
took place), singleton verdicts (tSu, where S itself is a set
of parties jointly causing a violation) and composite verdicts
(consisting of two or more elements, e.g., ttA,Bu, tA,Cuu if
A, B and C deviated, but A could have caused the violation
either jointly with B or with C). The main idea is that
the correctness of composite verdicts, e.g., ttA,Bu, tCuu,
follows from the correctness of the singleton verdicts they
are composed from, e.g., ttA,Buu and ttCuu, as long as all
traces that provoke the composite verdict relate to the singleton
verdict.
We assume the cases to be connected along these lines; all
cases resulting in an empty verdict have to guarantee ϕ to
hold (Vωi,Vi ). All cases resulting in singleton verdicts have
to imply that (a) a violation took place (Vωi,Vi ), (b) that
the parties in the verdict alone can provoke this violation
(SFSωi,ϕ,Vi“tSu), (c) these parties need to be corrupted when-
ever this case matches (Mϕ,Vi ) and (d) that the verdict is
unique (Uωi,Vi“tSu).
Composite verdicts need to relate to singleton verdicts by
means of a lifting R of the relation r (RLR,ωi,ωj ,Vi,Vj ). For
each part of a composite verdict, R points to the singleton ver-
dicts for the same parties. Therefore, it needs to be terminating
on singleton cases (RSR,Vi“tSu). As R is a lifting of r and
reflexive (i.e., all traces in the same case are related to each
other, RSR,Vi“tSu), completeness, sufficiency and minimality
carry over from singleton cases to composite cases, as long as
all parts of of the composite verdict are covered by a singleton
verdict (SFRR,ωi,ϕ,|Vi|ě2), and, vice versa, all related singleton
verdicts are contained in the composite verdicts (C|Vi|ě2). In
this way, we can avoid the requirement that the composite
verdict itself needs to define the minimal set of parties needed
to provoke a violation, which would not be the case in most
of our case studies.3 Instead, we only need a simple syntactic
check (MR,|Vi|ě2) to ensure that the parts of a composite
verdict are not contradictory with regards to the minimality
of the apv. Consider, e.g., the composite verdict ttA,Bu, Au.
In summary, the key to these verification conditions is to
express equivalence classes w.r.t. r and relations between them
in the case distinction describing the verdict function.
Example 4. Consider the extended centralized monitor (Ex-
ample 2) and assume that the logged signature distinguishes
which mechanism was used to effectuate an action and that
only one action can be effectuated. Assume further a verdict
function that (a) outputs ttDuu if the monitor logged and
effectuated an exceptional action signed by D, (b) outputs
ttC,Duu if it logged and effectuated an exceptional action
signed by D and C, and (c) outputs H otherwise. Minimality
can only hold if case (a) and case (b) are not in the relation.
Hence RLR,ωi,ωj ,Vi,Vj requires any trace falling into case (a)
to be unrelated from any trace falling in case (b). RSR,Vi“tSu
requires all traces leading to the observation in case (a) to
be related, and likewise for case (b). If we consider, e.g., the
monitor’s control flow rc, this can be shown automatically (cf.
Section VII). If we consider rk, it is essentially an axiom.
V. CALCULUS
Before we present our case studies, we will elaborate on
the protocol calculus in which they are stated. The calculus
we used is an extension of the well-known applied-pi calcu-
lus [2]. In addition to the usual operators for concurrency,
replication, communication, and name creation, from applied-
pi, this calculus (called SAPiC [20, 6]4) supports constructs for
accessing and updating an explicit global state, which is useful
for accountability protocols that rely on trusted third parties
retaining some state or a public ledger. Readers familiar with
the applied-pi calculus can jump straight to Section V-B, where
the modelling of corruption is explained. The constructs for
state manipulation are marked in Figure 1.
We will now introduce the syntax and informally explain
the semantics of the calculus. For the formal semantics, please
refer to Appendix A.
3Compare with the minimality requirement in Table I in Def. 3.
4 Our results apply to both the original version of SAPiC and the extension
with reliable channels.
Terms and equational theories: Messages are modelled as
abstract terms. We define an order-sorted term algebra with
the sort msg and two incomparable subsorts pub and fresh
for two countably infinite sets of public names (PN ) and fresh
names (FN ). Furthermore, we assume a countably infinite set
of variables for each sort s, Vs. Let V be the union of the
set of variables for all sorts. We write u : s when the name
or variable u is of sort s. Let Σ be a signature, i.e., a set
of function symbols, each with an arity. We write f{n when
function symbol f is of arity n. There is a subset Σpriv Ď Σ
of private function symbols which cannot be applied by the
adversary. Let Terms be the set of well-sorted terms built over
Σ, PN , FN and V , and M be the subset containing only
ground terms, i.e., terms without variables.
Equality is defined by means of an equational theory E, i.e.,
a finite set of equations between terms inducing a binary rela-
tion “E that is closed under application of function symbols,
bijective renaming of names and substitution of variables by
terms of the same sort.
Example 5. We model digital signatures using symbols
tsig , verify , pk , sk , trueu Ă Σ with sk P Σpriv , and equation
verifypsigpm, skpiqq,m, pkpskpiqqq “ true.
For the remainder of the article, we will assume the
signature Σ and equational theory E to contain symbols
and equations for pairing and projection tx., .y, fst, sndu Ď
Σ and equations fstpxx, yyq “ x and sndpxx, yyq “
y are in E. We use xx1, x2, . . . , xny as a shortcut for
xx1, xx2, x. . . , xxn´1, xny . . .y. We suppose that functions be-
tween terms are interpreted modulo E, i.e., if x “E y then
fpxq “ fpyq.
Facts: We also assume an unsorted signature Σfact , disjoint
from Σ. The set of facts is defined as F :“ tF pt1, . . . , tkq |
ti P TermsΣ, F P Σfact of arity ku and used to annotate
protocol steps.
Sets, sequences, and multisets: We write Nn for the set
t1, . . . , nu. Given a set S, we denote the set of finite sequences
of elements from S, by S˚. Set membership modulo E is
denoted by PE and defined as e PE S iff De1 P S. e1 “E e.
ĂE , YE , and “E are defined for sets in a similar way.
Application of substitution is lifted to sets, sequences and
multisets as expected. By abuse of notation we sometimes
interpret sequences as sets or multisets; the applied operators
should make the implicit cast clear.
A. Syntax and informal semantics
0 denotes the terminal process. P | Q is the parallel
execution of processes P and Q and !P the replication of
P allowing an unbounded number of sessions in protocol
executions. P `Q denotes external non-deterministic choice,
i.e., if P or Q can reduce to a process P 1 or Q1, P `Q may
reduce to either. The construct νa;P binds the name a P FN
in P and models the generation of a fresh, random value. The
processes out(m,n); P and in(m,n); P represent the output,
respectively input, of message n on channel m. As opposed to
xP ,Qy ::= 0
| P | Q
| ! P
| νa : fresh; P
| out(m,n); P
| in(m,n); P
| if Pred then P [else Q]
| event F ; P
| P `Q (non-deterministic choice)
| insert m,n; P (inserts n at cell m)
| delete m; P (deletes content of m)
| lookup m as x in P [else Q]
| lock m; P
| unlock m; P
Fig. 1. Syntax (a P FN , x P V , m,n P Terms Pred P P , F P F ).
classical
applied-pi
SA
PiC
additions
the applied pi calculus [2], SAPiC’s input construct performs
pattern matching instead of variable binding. If the channel is
left out, the public channel c is assumed, which is the case in
the majority of our examples. The process if Pred then P else
Q will execute P or Q, depending on whether Pred holds. For
example, if Pred “ equalpm,nq, and φequal “ x1 « x2, then
if equalpm,nq then P else Q will execute P if m “E n
and Q otherwise. (In the following, we will use m “ n as
a short-hand for equalpm,nq). The event construct is merely
used for annotating processes and will be useful for stating
security properties. For readability, we sometimes omit trailing
0 processes and else branches that consist of a 0 process.
The remaining constructs are used to manipulate state and
were introduced with SAPiC [20]. The construct insert m,n
binds the value n to a key m. Successive inserts overwrite this
binding, the delete m operation ‘undefines’ the binding. The
construct lookup m as x in P else Q allows for retrieving the
value associated to m, binding it to the variable x in P . If the
mapping is undefined for m, the process behaves as Q. The
lock and unlock constructs are used to gain or waive exclusive
access to a resource m, in the style of Dijkstra’s binary
semaphores: if a term m has been locked, any subsequent
attempt to lock m will be blocked until m has been unlocked.
This is essential for writing protocols where parallel processes
may read and update a common memory.
Example 6. The centralized monitor from Example 1 can be
modelled as follows. For NormalAct{0, we can model the
doctor’s role as follows:
D¨¨“inpa); if a = NormalAct then
outpxx1Do1, ay,signpx1Do1, ay,skp’D’))y).
The centralized monitor itself verifies the signature and logs
the access using the event construct. Note that it does not
check whether a constitutes a ‘normal’ action.
M¨¨“ pinpxm1 ¨¨“ x1Do1, ay,m1sy);
if verify pm1s,m1,pkpskp’D’)))=truep) then
event LogDpa);event Executepa))
To model these parties running arbitrarily many sessions in
parallel, we compose D and M to !D |!M .
As usual, the semantics are defined by means of a reduction
relation. A configuration c consists of the set of running
processes, the global store and more. By reducing some
process, it can transition into a configuration c1. This relation
is denoted c FÝÑ c1, where the fact F denotes an event, e.g.,
LogDpaq, or the adversary sending a message m, in which
case F “ Kpmq.
An execution is a sequence of related configurations, i.e.,
c1
F1ÝÑ ¨ ¨ ¨ FnÝÝÑ cn`1 The sequence of non-empty facts Fi
defines the trace of an execution. Given a ground process
P , tracespP q is the set of traces that start from an initial
configuration c0 (no messages emitted yet, no open locks etc.).
To specify trace properties, SAPiC and the underlying
Tamarin prover [36] support a fragment of first-order logic
with atoms F@i (fact F is at position i in trace), i ă j
(position i precedes position j) and equality on positions and
terms (see. Appendix B for its formal definition). We write
t ( ϕ if t satisfies a trace property ϕ.
B. Accountability protocols
A process by itself does not encode which of its sub-
processes represents which agent. Hence, for each agent A,
we assign a process PA. Furthermore, in order to model the
adversary taking control of agents, each agent needs to specify
a corruption procedure. At the least, this corruption procedure
outputs that agent’s secrets. In our calculus, these are the
free names (unbound by input or ν) in PA. To model other
capabilities obtained by corrupting an agent, e.g., database
access, we allow for an auxiliary process C 1A to be specified.
Definition 5 (accountability protocol). Assume a set of par-
ties A “ tA1, A2, . . . , Anu and T Ď A. An account-
ability protocol is a ground process of the following form:
ν~a; pPA1 | CA1 | ¨ ¨ ¨ | PAn | CAnq where CAi is
of form event CorruptpAiq; outp1c1, xa1, . . . , amyq;C 1Ai andta1, . . . , amu Ď ~a are the free names in PAi if Ai R T , and 0
otherwise.
Example 7. The centralized monitor protocol from Exam-
ples 1 and 6 is an accountability process
D | pevent Corruptp1D1q; outpskp1D1qq |M.
Processes accessing the store can specify auxiliary processes
CAi , as per default, SAPiC does not permit the adversary to
emit events or access the store. With these formal require-
ments, we can define the set of corrupted parties of a trace as
corruptedptq “ tA P A | CorruptpAq P tu.
The accountability mechanism is defined through the ac-
countability protocol itself and the verdict function. We require
the verdict function to be invariant w.r.t. E.
Example 8. The verdict function for the centralized monitor
protocol from Examples 1 and 6, which we sketched in
Example 3, can be specified as:
verdictptq “
#
ttDuu if t ( ω1
H if t ( ω2
for ω1 ¨¨“ Da, i, j.Executepaq@i ^ LogDpaq@j ^ a ‰
NormalAct and ω2 ¨¨“  ω1. As only ttDuu is to be blamed
in this example, this verdict function achieves accountability
for
ϕ ¨¨“ @a1, i1. Executepa1q@i1 ùñ a “ NormalAct ,
even w.r.t. the weakest relation rw. This can be shown automat-
ically by verifying the verification conditions for rw (Def. 3),
i.e.:
‚ exhaustiveness and exclusiveness,
‚ sufficiency of ttDuu pSFω1,ϕ,ttDuuq: there is a trace t s.t.
t ( Di.CorruptpDq@i ^  p@j, a. Executepaq@j ùñ
a “ NormalActq, i.e., a corrupt D is able to execute an
exceptional action.
‚ verifiability w.r.t. ω1 (Vω1,V1 ): ω1 ùñ  ϕ, which holds
a priori.
‚ verifiability w.r.t. ω2 (Vω2,V2 ): ω2 ùñ ϕ, i.e., the
absence of a log for an exceptional action means none
was effectuated.
‚ minimality of ttDuu (Mϕ,V1 ): ϕ _ Di.CorruptpDq@i.
Unless D was corrupted, no exceptional action was
effectuated.
‚ uniqueness of ttDuu (Uω1,V1 ): ωi ùñ
Di.CorruptpDq@i. An entry in the log blaming D
can only occur if D was actually corrupted.
VI. CASE STUDIES FOR rw
In this section and Section VIII, we demonstrate the fea-
sibility of our verification approach on various case studies
in different settings. We first concentrate on cases where
the weakest counterfactual relation rw is sufficient, including
practical examples like Certificate Transparency and OCSP-
Stapling.
We implemented our translation from accountability prop-
erties to conditions in SAPiC5, which provides support for
arbitrary relations (leaving the proofs for RLR,ωi,ωj ,Vi,Vj and
RSR,Vi“tSu to the user), the relation rc (as described in
Section VII) and the weakest possible relation rw (Section III).
Our fork retains full compatibility with the classic SAPiC
semantics, with the extension for liveness properties [6] and
operates without any substantial changes to Tamarin. By
default, our fork preserves multiset rewrite rules contained in
its input, and can thus also serve as a preprocessor for ac-
countability protocols encoded in Tamarin’s multiset rewriting
calculus.
Our findings are summarized in Table III. For each case
study, we give the type (X for successful verification, 7 if
5Currently available in the development branch of Tamarin and to be
included in the next release: https://github.com/tamarin-prover/tamarin-prover.
TABLE III
CASE STUDIES AND RESULTS.
# lemmas # helping
protocol type generated lemmas time
Whodunit
faulty 7,rw 16 0 395s
fixed X,rw 8 0 112s
Certificate Transp.
model from [10] X,rw 31 0 41s
extended model X,rw 21 0 50s
OCSP Stapling
trusted resp. X,rw 7 3 945s
untrusted resp. 7,rw 7 3 12s˚
Centralized monitor
faulty 7,rc 17 0 5s
fixed X,rc 17 0 3s
replication X,rc 17 0 7s
Causality
Desert traveller X,rc 16 0 7s
Early preempt. X,rc 16 0 1s
Late preempt. X,rc 16 0 13s
Accountable alg.
modified-1 X,rc 27 1 5792s
modified-2 X,rc 27 1 2047s
(*): time to find counter-examples for Vωi,Vi and Uωi,Vi .
S ¨¨“ in pa); outpcSA,a); outpcSJ ,a)
A ¨¨“ inpcSA,a); out pcAJ ,a)
J ¨¨“ inpcSJ ,a1); inpcAJ ,a2); if a1=a2 then event Equalp)
else event Unequalp)
ν cSA; νcAJ ; νcSJ ; pS |A |J |
!p inpx’ corrupt ’ ,xy) ; event Corruptedpx); outpskpx) ) ;
p if x=’S’ then outpcSA); out pcSJ ))
| p if x=’A’ then outpcSA); out pcAJ )))))
Fig. 2. Whodunit protocol[24, Ex. 8].
we discovered an attack), the number of lemmas generated by
our translation, the number of additional helping lemmas6 and
the time needed to verify all lemmas (even if an attack was
found). Verification was performed on a 2,7 GHz Intel Core
i5 with 8GB RAM.
Toy example: whodunit: The example in Figure 2 illustrates
the difference between verdicts larger than 2 and uncertainty
about the correct verdict. Two parties, S and A, coordinate
on some value chosen by S. S sends this value to A and to
a trusted party J . Then, A is supposed to forward this value
to J . We are interested in accountability for J receiving the
same value from S and A.
The crux here is that a correct verdict function cannot
exist: if J receives different values, there are two minimal
explanations for her. Either A altered the value it received
or S gave A a different value in the first place. Indeed, if
6SAPiC, as well as tamarin, are sound and complete, but the underlying
verification problem is undecidable [1]. Therefore, analyses in SAPiC/Tamarin
sometimes employ helping lemmas to help the verification procedure termi-
nate. Just like security properties, they are stated by the user and verified by
the tool.
O S J
cert
m1 “ xcert , t, goody, sigpm1, skOq
m1, sigpm1, skOq
Fig. 3. OCSP Stapling
we formalize this in two verdict functions, one blaming A if
the fact Unequal occurs in the trace, the other blaming S,
Tamarin finds a counterexample for each. If we change the
protocol so that S needs to sign her message, and A needs to
forward this signature, then we can prove accountability for
the verdict function that blames S in case of inequality.
Certificate Transparency: Certificate Transparency [35] is
a protocol that provides accountability to the public key
infrastructure. Clients are submitting certificates signed by
CAs to logging authorities (LAs), who store this information
in a Merkle tree. Auditors validate that these logs have not
been tampered with. Based on these trustworthy, distributed
logs, clients, e.g., domain owners, may detect misbehavior,
e.g., an unauthorised CA, issuing certificates for this domain.
We base our modelling on that of Bruni et.al. [10], which
considers a simplified setting with one CA, one LA, and two
honest auditors. We first verify accountability of the CA for
the property that any certificate in the log that is tested was
honestly registered. To this end, we, as well as Bruni et.al.,
have to assume access to the CA’s domain registration data.
We then verify accountability of the LA for the property that
any log entry that was provided was provided consistently to
all auditors. Finally, we compose both security properties and
verdict functions, and can thus show that CA and LA can be
held accountable at the same time.
While the original modelling prescribed cheating LAs to
cheat in a certain way (always provide the correct log entry to
auditor u1 and omit it to auditor u2), we extended the model
to permit deviating LAs to selectively provide log entries. This
complicates the formulation of the consistency criterion, but
makes the model slightly more realistic. Both models can be
verified within a minute.
OCSP Stapling: The Online Certificate Status Protocol
(OCSP [34]) provides an interface to query whether a digital
certificate is revoked, or not. Upon a request (which may
be signed or not), a trusted responder (e.g., a CA or a
delegate) gives a signed response containing a timestamp, the
certificate in question and its revocation status (good, revoked
or unknown). OCSP Stapling [33], is an extension to TLS that
specifies how a TLS server may attach a recent enough OCSP
response to a handshake. This reduces the communication
overhead. In addition, it avoids clients exposing their browsing
behavior to the OCSP server via their requests.
We model OCSP stapling as an accountability protocol
between a trusted OCSP responder O, an untrusted server
S and a trusted Judge J . The judge represents a client that
receives a stapled response from the server and seeks to
determine if its communication partner can be trusted. In
addition, a clocking process emits timestamps. Our modelling
is quite simplistic, e.g., the TLS Handshake is reduced to a
forwarding of the signed timestamp. The main challenge we
focussed on was defining the accountability property that is
actually achieved. First, note that a server can choose to reveal
its secret key at any time. In order to make any meaningful
statement about the revocation mechanism, we have to limit
ourselves to cases where, whenever a server reveals his secret,
it also revokes the corresponding certificate. We thus slightly
diverge from the corruption procedure in Definition 5, and
require the server to mark his certificate as revoked upon
corruption.
We can show accountability for ϕ “
 Dc, sk , t, i, j, k, l.Judgedpt, cq@i^ Secretpc, skq@j
^Kpskq@k ^ Timeptq@l ^ k ă l,
i.e., whenever a client received an OCSP response for a
certificate c with timestamp t (at which point Judgedpt, cq
is raised), she can be assured that the corresponding secret sk
was not leaked (recall that Kpskq marks the adversary sending
a message) at a point in time k prior to the emission of the
timestamp t at time l (but possibly later). Timestamps are here
modelled as public nonces emitted by the clock process. Prior
to outputting a nonce, the event Timeptq is emitted, binding
these nonces to positions in the trace.
To explore the limits of OCSP, we declare the OCSP
responder to be untrusted. We find an attack on the previous
accountability property where O reports a good certificate
status to J , despite the revocation triggered when corrupting
S. The techniques used by Milner et.al. to detect misuse of
secrets [32] could potentially be used to mitigate this issue.
We leave this research question for future work.
VII. VERIFYING RL AND RS
For protocols in which parties can collude, but can also
cause damage on their own, we need to verify accountability
with respect to a relation r between what actually happened,
and what could have happened with a subset of these parties
(see Example 2). The verification conditions in Section IV
provide a framework for many counterfactual relations r.
In this section, we show how r can be instantiated to the
relation rc discussed in Section II, so that the conditions
RLR,ωi,ωj ,Vi,Vj and RSR,Vi“tSu, and thus accountability as a
whole, can be verified with SAPiC and Tamarin. For other
relations, which includes relations that cannot be formally
stated such as rk, RLR,ωi,ωj ,Vi,Vj and RSR,Vi“tSu need to be
proven or justified on paper (but the remaining conditions can
be verified).
In practice, the control-flow of a process is not necessarily
the control-flow of its implementation. To leave some degree
of flexibility to the modeller, we allow for the control-flow to
be manually annotated and use a unary fact Control P Σfact
to mark control-flow. Per default, there should be exactly one
statement event Controlpp : pubq on each path from the root
to a leaf of the process tree of each process corresponding to
a trusted party. We can then define rcpt, t1q iff for all p and p1
s.t. Controlppq P t and Controlpp1q P t1, p “E p1.
The main challenge in proving RLR,ωi,ωj ,Vi,Vj and
RSR,Vi“tSu is that SAPiC supports only trace properties.7
Hence, in general, we can argue about all or some t, but not
about pairs of t and t1. The solution is to combine t and t1 in a
single trace, which is their concatenation. If for all occurrences
of Controlppq in the first part, and of Controlpp1q in the
second part, p and p1 coincide, then the t and t1 corresponding
to these two parts are in the relation. This technique is known
as self-composition [7].
Defining this sequential composition of P with itself is
technically challenging and requires altering the translation
from SAPiC to multiset rewrite rules — observe that P ;P
is not a syntactically valid process. Due to space limitations,
we refer to Appendix E in the full version [23] and F in the
full version [23] for the technical solution and its proof of
correctness (it is sound and complete), and will only discuss
the idea and limitations.
The idea is that the adversary can start executions with a
fresh execution id, which is used to annotate visible events. To
separate executions, the adversary can trigger a stopping event.
A rewriting of the security property ensures that it is trivially
true, unless both executions are properly separated, i.e., every
execution is terminated, events are enclosed by start and stop
events, and these events themselves define disjoint intervals.
Note that for a process where a trusted party is under
replication, it is possible that two different Controlpq-events
are emitted in the same execution, and thus the corresponding
process is in no equivalence class w.r.t. rc. This affects only
one of our case studies (centralized monitor), however, instead
of considering a possibly replicating series of violations,
we chose to identify the party causing the first violation.
Appendix E in the full version [23] discusses other possible
solutions to this issue in more detail.
VIII. CASE STUDIES FOR rc
The most challenging protocols from an accountability per-
spective are those in which joint misbehaviour is possible. The
centralized monitoring mechanism from Example 2 provides
such an example, as well as the accountable algorithm’s
protocol proposed by Kroll. In both cases, an analysis w.r.t. a
more restrictive counterfactual relation is strictly necessary.
We opt for the relation rc, relating runs having the same
control-flow. To this end, we use the elaborate verification
condition for arbitrary r (Def. 4) and automate the analysis of
RLR,ωi,ωj ,Vi,Vj and RSR,Vi“tSu by considering the sequential
self-composition of the protocol as described in the previous
section. Owing to our accountability definition’s origins in
causation, we will discuss examples of ‘preemption’ from the
causation literature, which are considered difficult to handle,
but can be tamed by considering the control-flow of execution.
7Tamarin supports diff-equivalence [8]. This variant of observational equiv-
alence considers two processes unequal if they move into different branches,
hence it is not suitable for our case.
D¨¨“inpa);
if isNormalpa) then
outpxm1 ¨¨“ x1Do1, ay,signpm1,skp’D’))y)
else if isSpecial pa) then
outpxm2 ¨¨“ x1Permit1, ay,signpm2,skp’D’))y))
C¨¨“inpxm2 ¨¨“ x1Permit1, ay,m2sy);
if verify pm2s, m2, pkpskp’D’)))= truep) then
if isSpecial pa) then
outpxm3 ¨¨“ xm2,m2sy,signpm3,skp’C’))y)
M¨¨“
p inpxm1 ¨¨“ x1Do1, ay,m1sy);
if verify pm1s,m1,pkpskp’D’)))=truep) then
event Controlp’0’ , ’1’) ;event LogDpa);event Executepa))
+pinpxm3 ¨¨“ xm2,m2sy,m3sy); // for m2 ¨¨“ x1Permit1, ay
if verify pm3s, m3, pkpskp’C’))) = truep) then
if verify pm2s, m2, pkpskp’D’))) = truep) then
event Controlp’0’ , ’2’) ;event LogDCpa);event Executepa))
!pD |C) |M
| // give access to public keys
poutppkpskp’D’))) ;outppkpskp’C’)) ) ;outppkpskp’M’))))
| !p inp’c’ ,x’ corrupt ’ ,xy) ;
event Corruptedpx); outp’c’ , skpx) ) ) )
Fig. 4. Centralized monitor.
Note that we omit code listings for most examples, however,
they come with the implementation.
Centralized monitor: Example 2 considered a protocol
based on a central trust monitor M . Albeit modelled in a very
abstract form (the actual protocols are likely to be tailored for
their use case), this kind of mechanism occurs in various forms
in plenty of real-world scenarios. We want to demonstrate that,
in principle, we can handle such scenarios.
A party D can effectuate actions, some of which are
usual (e.g., a doctor requesting his patient’s file), some of
which are not (e.g., requesting the file of another doctor’s
patient). Rather than blocking access for exceptional action,
these are logged by M , (e.g., if another doctor’s patient has
a heart attack and needs treatment right away), which is an
accountability problem w.r.t. the property that no exceptional
action happened. A supervisor C (e.g., chief of medicine) is
needed to effectuate a third class of actions, special actions,
for which D needs to get C’s authorization. The processes of
parties D, C and M are running in parallel with a process
that outputs their public keys and their private keys on request
(see Fig. 4).
We use function symbols NormalAct{0, SpecialAct{0,
ExcAct{0 to denote these kinds of actions, and sig{2, verify{2
to model digital signatures.
D receives an action a from the adversary (for generality)
and either signs it and sends it to M directly (if a is ‘normal’),
or signs a permission request, which C has to sign first (if a is
‘special’). C only signs requests for special actions. M non-
deterministically guesses what kind of message arrives, and
verifies that the signatures are correct. If this is the case, the
action is executed.
We investigate accountability for the property that only
‘special’ or ‘normal’ actions are executed:
@a, i.Executepaq@i
ùñ a “ SpecialActpq _ a “ NormalActpq
Within 3 seconds, our toolchain shows that the verdict
function that maps the occurrence of LogD to ttDuu and the
occurrence of LogDC to ttD,Cuu provides accountability for
this property.
The first protocol design was (without intention) erroneous.
We find two attacks within 5 seconds (for falsification and
verification of all lemmas).
For simplicity, M is not covered under replication. Putting
M under replication, it is possible to have two different
Control -events in the same run, which entails that no second
trace can relate via rc. We can, however, prove a modified
property ϕ1 which is true only if there are no violations to
ϕ, or at least two. Intuitively, this means that we can point
out which party caused the first violation by considering,
for every violating trace, the prefix which contains only one
violation. This is possible for all safety-properties, as they are,
by definition, prefix-closed [28]. In addition, we modify M to
only emit Control -events when acting upon an action that is
neither normal nor special, i.e., we consider only control-flow
for actions which produce violations.
Examples from causation literature: As our accountability
definition is rooted in causation, we chose to model three ex-
amples from the causation literature, two from Lewis’ seminal
work on counterfactual reasoning [29], and one formulated
by Hitchcock [18, p. 526]. They all encode problems of
preemption, where a process that would cause an event (e.g., a
violation) is interrupted by a second processes. All examples
are verified in a couple of seconds. We refer to Appendix G
in the full version [23] for details.
Kroll’s Accountable Algorithms protocol: The most inter-
esting case study is the accountable algorithms protocol of
Kroll [21, Chapter 5]. It lets an authority A, e.g., a tax
authority, perform computations for a number of subjects S1
to Sn, e.g., the validation of tax returns. Any subject can
verify, using a public log, that the value it receives has been
computed correctly w.r.t. the input it provides and some secret
information that is the same for all parties. We substantially
extend this protocol to also provide accountability for the
subjects: if a subject decides to falsely claim that the authority
cheated, we can validate their claim. This is a very instructive
scenario, as now any party emitting logs or claims can just lie.
It also demonstrates that a trusted third party is not needed to
provide accountability. While we define a judgment process
J , which is technically a trusted party (it is always honest),
this party is (a) not involved in the protocol and (b) can be
computed by anyone, e.g., a journalist, an oversight body, or
the general public.
The goal is to compute a function f on inputs x and
y; f representing an arbitrary algorithm, x the subject’s
input, and y some secret policy that f takes into account
(e.g., an income threshold to decide which tax returns need
Public log Authority A Subject S
Init , Cy
xm1 ¨¨“ x1, x, r1x, sigC1xy, sigm1y
z ¨¨“ fpx, yq
xr ¨¨“ x2, z, rz, rxy, sigry
Log , xsigC1x , ZKp. . .q, C 1xy
Log , xsigC1x , ZKp. . .q, C 1xy
¨ ¨ ¨
Final
Fig. 5. Honest protocol run for accountable algorithm protocol.
extra scrutiny). The policy y is the same for all sub-
jects. First, the authority commits on y (see Figure 5). We
model commitments using the symbols commit{2, open{2,
verCom{2 and equations openpcommitpm, rq, rq “ m and
verCompcommitpm, rq, rq “ truepq. Next, the subject sends
its input x along with randomness for its desired commitment
r1x and a signature for the commitment C 1x ¨¨“ commitpx, r1xq.
Now the authority computes z “ fpx, yq and returns z, as
well as the randomness which was used to compute two
commitments on its own, Cx on x and Cz on z. The signed
commitment C 1x and a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) are stored
in a public append-only log, e.g., the blockchain. The log is
modelled via the store and a global assumption that entries
cannot be overwritten. The ZKP contains the three commit-
ments Cx, Cy and Cz and shows that they are commitments
to x, y and z such that fpx, yq “ z. Using this ZKP, one
can check that Cy is the value initially committed to, and that
the input x and the output z are consistent. Now A proceeds
with the next subject, and appends a Final message to the
log to indicate when it is done. S can decide to file a claim,
consisting of x, z, r1x and the signed message it received from
A in the second step.
The original protocol was implemented with hash func-
tions and ZK-SNARKs. Kroll’s preliminary analysis [21,
Section 5.2.2] was informal and only considered holding
the authority accountable. Later analysis discovered that any
subject can falsely accuse the authority A of misbehavior [24].
Obviously, such a claim would subvert the trust into the
system and hence render the accountability mechanism useless
in practice. Consequently, we extended the protocol with a
message authentication mechanism based on digital signatures
so that A and Si prove their identity and protect themselves
from false accusations, as well as C 1x, which is a second
commitment on x generated by S instead of A.
This commitment (along with S’es signature) serves as a
witness that the input which A claims to have received is
indeed the one S has sent, without revealing x to the public.
On the other hand, we simplified Kroll’s protocol by re-
moving randomness generation for f , which was implemented
using verifiable random functions. We outline in Section X
how this feature calls for a definition of accountability in the
S¨¨“ let res = x’2’ , z , rz , rxy
claim = x’3’ , x , z , res , sig res , rxpy
Cxp = commitpx, rxp)
m1 = x’1’ , x , rxp , signpCxp, skp’S’) )y
sig cxp = fst plog)
zkp = fst psndplog) )
CxpL = sndpsndplog))
Cy = fst psndpPubpzkp)))
in
lookup x’A’, ’ Init ’y as CyL in
ν x; ν rxp; out pxm1, signpm1,skp’S’) )y) ;
lookup x’A’,’Log’,’S’y as log in
if and4p verZKpzkp), eqpsig cxp, signpCxp, skp’S’) ) ) ,
eqpCxpL,Cxp), eqpCy, CyL)) then
in pxres , sig resy) ;
if verify psig res , res , pkpskp’A’)))=truep)
then
out pxclaim, signpclaim, skp’S’) )y)
A¨¨“ let m1 = x’1’, x, rxp, sig cxpy
z = fpx, y)
res = x’2’ , z , rz , rxy
Cx = commitpx, rx)
Cy = commitpy, ry)
Cz = commitpz, rz )
Cxp = commitpx, rxp)
zkp = ZKpxCx,Cy,Czy,x,y,z , rx , ry , rz )
sig res = signpres , skp’A’))
in
ν y; ν ry;
insert x’A’, ’ Init ’y , Cy;
in pxm1, sig m1y); ν rx; ν rz ;
if and3p verify psig m1,m1,pkpskp’S’) ) ) ,
eqpx, openpCxp,rxp)) ,
verify psig cxp,Cxp,pkpskp’S’) ) ) ) then
out pxres , sig resy) ; // send result to S
insert x’A’,’Log’,’S’y , xsig cxp, zkp , Cxpy;
insert x’A’,’ Final ’y , truep)
!pA |S) |J |
outppkpskp’A’))) ; outppkpskp’S’) ) )
|
!p inp’c’ ,x’ corrupt ’ ,xy) ;event Corruptedpx);outp’c’ , skpx) ) ;
!pp if x=’A’ then inpy); insert x’A’,’ Init ’y ,y)
| p if x=’A’ then inpy); insert x’A’,’Log’,’S’y , y)
| p if x=’A’ then inpy); insert x’A’,’ Final ’y , y) )
| p if x=’A’ then lookup x’A’,’Log’,’S’y as y in outpy) )
| p if x=’S’ then lookup x’A’,’Log’,’S’y as y in outpy) )
) )
Fig. 6. Accountable algorithms protocol.
computational setting.
We model this protocol as an accountability process with
three subprocesses A, S and a judging procedure J (see
Figure 6 and 7). This judging procedure essentially determines
the verdict by inspecting the log and a claim output by S. For
brevity, we introduce a symbol eq{2 with equation eqpx, xq “
true and predicates and3 and and4 which evaluate to true if
all three or four terms equal the constant true . We also use
syntactic sugar let v “ t in P to denote the literal substitution
of v by t in P .
J¨¨“ let res = x’2’ , z , rz , rxy
claim = x’3’ , x , z , res , sig res , rxpy
sig cxp = fst plog) // log is xsig cxp, zkp , Cxpy;
zkp = fst psndplog) )
CxpL = sndpsndplog))
Cx = fst pPubpzkp))
Cy = fst psndpPubpzkp)))
Cz = sndpsndpPubpzkp)))
in
in pxclaim, sig claimy) ;
if verify psig claim, claim, pkpskp’S’) ) ) = truep) then
lookup x’A’,’ Final ’y as y in
event Finalp) ;
lookup x’A’,’ Init ’y as CyL in
event CommpCyL);
lookup x’A’,’Log’,’S’y as log in
// first check validity of the log by itself ,
if and3pverZKpzkp), eqpCyL, Cy), // produced by A
verify psig cxp,CxpL,pkpskp’S’) ) ) ) // verified by A
then
if and3p verify psig res , res ,pkpskp’A’))) , // honest S
verifies this
verCompCxpL,rxp), // produced by S
eqpx, openpCxpL,rxp))) ) // both signed by S
then // We now believe S is honest and its claim valid
if and4pverCompCx,rx), verCompCz,rz),
eqpx, openpCx, rx) ) ,eqpz , openpCz, rz ) ) )
then
event Controlp’0’ , ’1’) ;event HonestSp);
event HonestAp);event Verified pclaim)
else
if oraclepx,Cy,z)=truep) then // see below.
event Controlp’0’ , ’2’) ;event HonestSp);
event HonestAp); event Verified pclaim)
else
event Controlp’0’ , ’3’) ;event HonestSp);
event DisHonestAp); event Verified pclaim)
else // A’s log is ok, but S is definitely cheating
if oraclepx,Cy,z)=truep) then
event Controlp’0’ , ’4’) ;event HonestSp);
event HonestAp); event Verified pclaim) )
else
event Controlp’0’ , ’5’) ;event DisHonestSp);
event HonestAp);event Verified pclaim)
else p // A is dishonest and produced bad log
if oraclepx,CyL,z)=truep) then
event Controlp’0’ , ’6’) ;event HonestSp);
event HonestAp);event Verified pclaim)
else
event Controlp’0’ , ’7’) ;event DisHonestAp);
event DisHonestSp);
// S checks log before submitting claimÑ S dishonest
event Verified pclaim) )
Fig. 7. Accountable algorithms protocol: judging procedure.
The verdict function is a trivial conversion of the events
emitted by the judging procedure J , which inspects the log
and evaluates the claim for consistency (see Figure 7). We
decided for this approach in order to ensure that the judgement
can be made by the public, and to provide an algorithmic
description on how to do so, since a verdict function can easily
be written to rely on information that is not available or not
computable. J is technically a trusted party in the sense that
it is always honest. However, J is not involved in the protocol
and the fact can be computed after the fact by anyone who
receives the claim, e.g., a newspaper, an oversight body, or the
general public. A dishonest J merely means that the verdict
function is computed incorrectly, in which case we cannot,
and should not, make any guarantees. The verdict function
maps traces in which DishonestA and DishonestS appear to
be ttA,Suu, and traces with DishonestA and HonestS to
be ttAuu. It provides the protocol with accountability for the
following property ϕ:
@t, x, z, r, sigr, rx1 .Verifiedpxt, x, z, r, sigr, rx1yq@k
ùñ Dj, i, y, ry.Finalpq@i^ Commpcommitpy, ryqq@j
^ z “ fpx, yq ^ i ă j ă k.
This property guarantees that any claim considered by the
judging procedure is correctly computed w.r.t. f and the
initial commitment to y. Note that a violation requires a
Verified -event, which J only emits if, and only if, the first
conditional and the two subsequent lookups are successful.
The conditional formulates the requirement of a claim to
be signed by S, the two lookups require A to indicate the
protocol is finished and to have produced an Init entry, in
order to ensure that the claim is only filed after the protocol
has finished.
The judging procedure needs to rely on an external oracle
to determine whether a violation actually took place. This is
a restriction, as it requires any party making a judgement
to have access to such an oracle. We need this for the
following reason: accountability implies verifiability, hence,
even if the logs have been tampered with, and they do
not contain usable information, the verdict function needs
to nevertheless output the empty verdict if z “ fpx, yq.
For example, if Cy in the log does not match x1 and z
in claim, i.e., z ‰ fpx1, openpCy, ryqq, but the logged Cx
is a commitment to a different x, it could well be the
case that z “ fpx, yq. Figuratively speaking, the adversary
tries to trick us into thinking something went wrong. We
represent the oracle as a function symbol oracle{3 with equa-
tion oraclepx, commitpy, ryq, fpx, yqq “ true , and restrain
ourselves to only use this function in the judging procedure.
The judging procedure is instructive in the constraints it
puts on the parties. Broadly speaking, they have to assist J in
holding the opposite party accountable by validating incoming
messages. E.g., if A manipulates the log by providing an
invalid ZKP, S terminates, and ϕ is trivially true. This ensures
that J can count on the validity of the log unless S is
dishonest. On the other hand, A can now stall the process.
From a protocol design perspective, this raises the following
challenges: 1. Are there guiding principles for the judging
procedure? (Our design involved a lot or trial and error, which
is only a viable strategy due to the tool support we have.)
2. Is it possible to achieve accountability for timeliness, i.e.,
the property that the protocol eventually finishes [6]? 3. Can
we do without oracle access in the judging procedure?
The verification of the modified variant of Kroll’s protocol
takes about two hours. An alternative way of fixing this model
requires a modified zero-knowledge proof but is structurally
closer to the original proposal. In order to avoid maintaining
both Cx (chosen by A) and Cx1 (chosen by S), we allow S
to chose Cx, i.e., the commitment to x in the public part of
the ZKP, similar to how the commitment to y has to match
the commitment sent out at the beginning of the protocol. We
therefore modelled and verified both fixes, but present only
one here. This second variant can be verified in half an hour.
In both cases, the analysis is fully automatic, but a helping
lemma (which itself is verified automatically) was added for
speedup. It states that lookups for the same key in the log
always give the same result.
IX. RELATED WORK
The focus of this work is on accountability in the security
setting; here we understand accountability as the ability to
identify malicious parties. Early work on this subject provides
or uses a notion of accountability in either an informal way,
or tailored to the protocol and its security [3, 21, 4, 5]. The
difficulty is defining what constitutes ‘malicious behavior’
and what this means for completeness, i.e., the ability of a
protocol to hold all malicious parties accountable. Jagadeesan
et al. provided the first generalized notion of accountability,
considering parties malicious if they deviate from the protocol.
But in their model, ‘the only auditor capable of provid-
ing [completeness] is one which blames all principals who
are capable of dishonesty, regardless of whether they acted
dishonestly or not’ [19]. Algorithms in distributed systems,
e.g., PeerReview [17], use this notion to detect faults in the
Byzantine setting, but need a complete local view of all
participating agents. Our corruption model is also Byzantine,
however, we work in the security setting and thus we do not
assume that a complete view of every component or the whole
communication is available.
For the security setting, Ku¨sters et al. recognize that com-
pleteness according to this definition of maliciousness cannot
be fulfilled (while remaining sound), because it ‘includes
misbehavior that is impossible to be observed by any other
party [or is harmless]’. They propose to capture completeness
via policies. Ku¨nnemann et al. [24] argue that these policies
are not expressive enough. In case of joint misbehavior,
the policy is either incomplete, unfair, or it encodes the
accountability mechanism itself [24]. Other approaches focus
on protocol actions as causes for security violations [16, 12,
15]. However, not all protocol actions that are related to an
attack are necessarily malicious. Consider, e.g., an attack that
relies on the public key retrieved from a key server — the
sending of the public key is causally related to the violation,
but harmless in itself. While causally related protocol actions
can be a filter and a useful forensic tool, they refer us back to
the original question: What constitutes malicious misbehavior?
Ku¨nnemann et al. [24] answer these questions by consider-
ing the fact that a party deviated as a potential cause [24]. The
main difference between their framework and the present is
that they define a calculus which allows for individual parties
to deviate. In particular, deviating parties can communicate
with each other and make their future behavior dependent on
such signals. This allows to encode ‘artificial’ causal depen-
dencies in their behavior, e.g., a party A, instead of mounting
an attack, waits for an arbitrary message from a second party
B before doing so. If one only observes A’s attack, the
involvement of B is as plausible as the idea of A acting on
its own. This kind of ‘provocation’ can occur whenever B can
secretly communicate with A. As out-of-band channels cannot
be excluded in practice, this shows that accountability is im-
possible. In the single-adversary setting, provocation cannot be
encoded: all deviating parties are represented by the adversary;
neither B sending the provocation message to A, nor A
conditioning the attack on the arrival of this message can be
expressed. As the case studies show, the provocation problem
vanishes. This implies that the single-adversary setting comes
at a loss of generality — although it is a commonly assumed
worst-case assumption in security. They propose ‘knowledge-
optimal’ attacks, where only secret information is exchanged,
which we conjecture to be equivalent to the single-adversary
setting following [24, Lemma 3].
Independently, Bruni, Giustolisi and Schu¨rmann, propose a
definition of accountability that is based on parties choosing to
deviate [10]. In contrast to our verdict function, they consider
per-party tests, e.g., ‘Is party A to be held accountable in this
run’. Any set of these tests can be interpreted as a verdict
function that outputs the set of singleton sets for which the
test gave true. In fact, this is how we constructed the verdict
function in the Certificate Transparency case study from their
tests. The downside to this approach is that joint account-
ability is not expressible, excluding, e.g., the case studies
in Section VIII. Nevertheless, it is instructive to compare
their definition to our verification conditions for rw (other
relations are not covered). The definition has four criteria,
three of which have logically equivalent formulae in our set
of verification conditions. Their fourth criterion, however, is
weaker (than Vωi,Vi ), and our criterion SFωi,ϕ,S is missing
in their definition. We argue that both conditions are strictly
necessary: without SFωi,ϕ,S, a protocol that does not even
permit a violation (ϕ is always true), could fulfill all their
criteria and still (unfairly!) blame a party. Furthermore, their
counterpart to Vωi,Vi allows violations to remain undetected
under certain circumstances. We elaborate this in Appendix H
in the full version [23]. This confirms our top-down approach:
by building on accountability as a problem of causation, we
were able to ground our verification conditions in Def. 1.
We are able to specify exactly what our verdict function is
computing and can be sure to not forget conditions.
X. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We demonstrated the practicality of verifying accountability
in security protocols with a high degree of automation, and
thus call for the analysis of existing and the invention of new
protocols that provide for accountability, instead of blindly
trusting third parties, e.g., voting protocols.
The present definitions apply to a wide-range of protocol
calculi. We implemented support for the SAPiC calculus,
which allows for a precise definition of control-flow. However,
the definition we provide cannot express computational or
statistical indistinguishability. For this reason, we had to sim-
plify Kroll’s accountable algorithms protocol, and ignore its
ability to randomize the computation using a verifiable random
function, and thus implement, e.g., accountable lotteries. A
computational variant of our definition would be desirable, but
it poses some technical challenges. In particular, counterfac-
tual adversaries shall not depend on the randomness actually
used, which prohibits a straight-forward translation and thus
renders the formulation of a generalized accountability game
an interesting question for future research.
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APPENDIX
A. Operational semantics
Frames and deduction: Before giving the formal semantics
of SAPiC, we introduce the notions of frame and deduction.
A frame consists of a set of fresh names n˜ and a substitution
σ, and is written νn˜.σ. Intuitively, a frame represents the
sequence of messages that have been observed by an adversary
during a protocol execution and secrets n˜ generated by the
protocol, a priori unknown to the adversary. Deduction models
the capacity of the adversary to compute new messages from
the observed ones.
Definition 6 (Deduction). We define the deduction relation
νn˜.σ $ t as the smallest relation between frames and terms
defined by the deduction rules in Figure 8.
Operational semantics: We can now define the operational
semantics of our calculus. The semantics is defined by a
labelled transition relation between process configurations. A
process configuration is a 5-tuple pX ,S,P, σ,Lq where
‚ X Ď FN is the set of fresh names generated by the
processes;
‚ S : MΣ ÑMΣ is a partial function modeling the store;
‚ P is a multiset of ground processes representing the
processes executed in parallel;
‚ σ is a ground substitution modeling the messages output
to the environment;
‚ L ĎMΣ is the set of currently active locks
The transition relation is defined by the rules in Figure 9.
Transitions are labelled by sets of ground facts. For readability,
we omit empty sets and brackets around singletons, i.e., we
a P FN Y PN a R n˜
νn˜.σ $ a DNAME
νn˜.σ $ t t “E t1
νn˜.σ $ t1 DEQ
x P dompσq
νn˜.σ $ xσ DFRAME
νn˜.σ $ t1 ¨ ¨ ¨ νn˜.σ $ tn f P ΣkzΣkpriv
νn˜.σ $ fpt1, . . . , tnq DAPPL
Fig. 8. Deduction rules.
Standard operations:
pX ,S,P Y# t0u, σ,Lq ÝÑ pX ,S,P, σ,Lq
pX ,S,P Y# tP |Qu, σ,Lq ÝÑ pX ,S,P Y# tP,Qu, σ,Lq
pX ,S,P Y# t!P u, σ,Lq ÝÑ pX ,S,P Y# t!P, P u, σ,Lq
pX ,S,P Y# tνa;P u, σ,Lq ÝÑ pX Y ta1u,S,P Y# tP ta1{auu, σ,Lq
if a1 is fresh
pX ,S,P, σ,Lq KpMqÝÝÝÝÑ pX ,S,P, σ,Lq if νX .σ $M
pX ,S,P Y# toutpM,Nq;P u, σ,Lq KpMqÝÝÝÝÑ pX ,S,P Y# tP u, σ Y tN{xu,Lq
if x is fresh and νX .σ $M
pX ,S,P Y# tinpM,Nq;P u, σ,Lq KpxM,NτyqÝÝÝÝÝÝÝÑ pX ,S,P Y# tPτu, σ,Lq
if νX .σ $M,νX .σ $ Nτ and τ is grounding for N
pX ,S,P Y# toutpM,Nq;P, inpM 1, N 1q;Qu, σ,Lq ÝÑ pX ,S,P Y tP,Qτu, σ,Lq
if M “E M 1 and N “E N 1τ and τ grounding for N 1
pX ,S,P Y tif prpM1, . . . ,Mnq then P else Qu, σ,Lq ÝÑ pX ,S,P Y tP u, σ,Lq
if φprtM1{x1 , . . . ,Mn {xnu is satisfied
pX ,S,P Y tif prpM1, . . . ,Mnq then P else Qu, σ,Lq ÝÑ pX ,S,P Y tQu, σ,Lq
if φprtM1{x1 , . . . ,Mn {xnu is not satisfied
pX ,S,P Y tevent(F ); P u, σ,Lq FÝÑ pX ,S,P Y tP u, σ,Lq
Operations on global state:
pX ,S,P Y# tinsert M,N ; P u, σ,Lq ÝÑ pX ,SrM ÞÑ N s,P Y# tP u, σ,Lq
pX ,S,P Y# tdelete M ; P u, σ,Lq ÝÑ pX ,SrM ÞÑ Ks,P Y# tP u, σ,Lq
pX ,S,P Y# tlookup M as x in P else Q u, σ,Lq ÝÑ pX ,S,P Y# tP tV {xuu, σ,Lq
if SpNq “E V is defined and N “E M
pX ,S,P Y# tlookup M as x in P else Q u, σ,Lq ÝÑ pX ,S,P Y# tQu, σ,Lq
if SpNq is undefined for all N “E M
pX ,S,P Y# tlock M ; P u, σ,Lq ÝÑ pX ,S,P Y# tP u, σ,LY tMuq if MREL
pX ,S,P Y# tunlock M ; P u, σ,Lq ÝÑ pX ,S,P Y# tP u, σ,LztM 1 |M 1 “E Muq
Fig. 9. Operational semantics.
write Ñ for HÝÑ and fÝÑ for tfuÝÑ. We write Ñ˚ for the
reflexive, transitive closure of Ñ (the transitions that are
labelled by the empty sets) and write
fñ for Ñ˚ fÑÑ˚. We
can now define the set of traces, i.e., possible executions that
a process admits.
Definition 7 (Traces of P ). Given a ground process P , we
define the traces of P as
tracespP q “
!
pF1, . . . , Fnq |
c0
F1ùñ˚ . . . Fnùñ˚ cn
)
, where
c0 “ pH,H, tP u,H,H,Hq, A progressing trace additionally
fulfils the condition that all processes in Pn are blocking [6,
Def. 2].
If we are interested in liveness properties, we will only
consider the set of progressing traces, i.e., traces that end
with a final state. Intuitively, a state is final if all messages
on resilient channels have been delivered and the process is
blocking [6, Def. 2, 3].
B. Security properties
In the Tamarin tool [36], security properties are described
in an expressive two-sorted first-order logic. The sort temp is
used for time points, Vtemp are the temporal variables.
Definition 8 (Trace formulae). A trace atom is either false
K, a term equality t1 « t2, a timepoint ordering i Ì j, a
timepoint equality i .“ j, or an action F@i for a fact F P F
and a timepoint i. A trace formula is a first-order formula
over trace atoms.
( If clear from context, we use t1 “ t2 instead of t1 « t2,
i ă j instead of i Ì j, and i “ j instead ofi .“ j.)
To define the semantics, let each sort s have a domain
dompsq. domptempq “ Q, dompmsgq “M, dompfreshq “
FN , and domppubq “ PN . A function θ : V ÑMYQ is a
valuation if it respects sorts, i.e., θpVsq Ă dompsq for all sorts
s. If t is a term, tθ is the application of the homomorphic
extension of θ to t.
Definition 9 (Satisfaction relation). The satisfaction relation
ptr , θq ( ϕ between a trace tr , a valuation θ, and a trace
formula ϕ is defined as follows:
ptr , θq ( K never
ptr , θq ( F@i ðñ θpiq P idx ptrq ^ Fθ PE trθpiq
ptr , θq ( i Ì j ðñ θpiq ă θpjq
ptr , θq ( i .“ j ðñ θpiq “ θpjq
ptr , θq ( t1 « t2 ðñ t1θ “E t2θ
ptr , θq (  ϕ ðñ not ptr , θq ( ϕ
ptr , θq ( ϕ1 ^ ϕ2 ðñ ptr , θq ( ϕ1 and ptr , θq ( ϕ2
ptr , θq ( Dx : s.ϕ ðñ there is u P dompsq
such that ptr , θrx ÞÑ usq ( ϕ.
For readability, we define t1 Í t2 as  pt1 Ì t2 _ t1 .“ t2q
and (ď¨, ­ .“, ě¨) as expected. We also use classical notational
shortcuts such as t1 Ì t2 Ì t3 for t1 Ì t2 ^ t2 Ì t3 and
@i ď j. ϕ for @i. i ď j Ñ ϕ. When ϕ is a ground formula
we sometimes simply write tr ( ϕ as the satisfaction of ϕ is
independent of the valuation.
Definition 10 (Validity, satisfiability). Let Tr Ď pPpGqq˚ be
a set of traces. A trace formula ϕ is said to be valid for Tr
(written Tr (@ ϕ) if for any trace tr P Tr and any valuation
θ we have that ptr , θq ( ϕ.
A trace formula ϕ is said to be satisfiable for Tr , written
Tr (D ϕ, if there exist a trace tr P Tr and a valuation θ such
that ptr , θq ( ϕ.
Note that Tr (@ ϕ iff Tr *D  ϕ. Given a multiset
rewriting system R we say that ϕ is valid, written R (@ ϕ,
if tracesmsr pRq (@ ϕ. We say that ϕ is satisfied in R,
written R (D ϕ, if tracesmsr pRq (D ϕ. Similarly, given a
ground process P we say that ϕ is valid, written P (@ ϕ, if
tracespP q (@ ϕ, and that ϕ is satisfied in P , written P (D ϕ,
if tracespP q (D ϕ.
